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Abstract 
Regulatory engagement theory (Higgins, 2006; Higgins & Scholer, 2009) proposes that 
engagement strength plays a critical role in the creation of value intensity. We discuss the ways 
in which engagement, in this model, can be distinguished from arousal, motivation to act, and 
experienced difficulty. We distinguish between the mechanisms and predictions made by 
regulatory engagement theory versus cognitive dissonance theory and a goal systems approach. 
We also describe the complexities and conditions under which some sources of engagement 
strength (e.g., regulatory fit) may relate to value creation. For instance, while regulatory fit has 
more typically been associated with increased engagement strength, regulatory nonfit may also 
sometimes increase engagement by serving as an obstacle to be overcome. We review existing 
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 We argued in our target article (Higgins & Scholer, 2009) that to understand how much or 
how little people value something, it’s necessary to consider not only the outcomes of goal 
pursuit (e.g., the quality of the chocolate in the chocolate lava cake, the molten nature of the cake 
center) but also the process of goal pursuit itself (e.g., the obstacles encountered in the process of 
obtaining the cake, the decision processes used to select the cake versus the crème brûlée). 
Specifically, we proposed that an individual’s strength of engagement in goal pursuit plays a 
critical role in how intensely an individual will value the chocolate lava cake (or any other value 
target) (see also Higgins, 2006; 2009).  Furthermore, and importantly, value intensity can be 
influenced by a number of sources of engagement strength that are independent of factors that 
determine value direction. 
 Our target article extended regulatory engagement theory as proposed by Higgins (2006). It 
presented new evidence for how a number of different sources of engagement strength contribute 
to value intensity.  It also expanded the theory by differentiating more clearly between the effects 
of these sources of engagement strength on the value intensity of the target versus the 
experiential quality of the goal pursuit activity itself. We begin our response to the commentaries 
by clarifying some key conceptual points about regulatory engagement theory.  We then discuss 
some of the general themes that emerged across all four commentaries.  
Regulatory Engagement Theory: Conceptual Clarifications 
 Regulatory engagement theory distinguishes between two contributors to the value 
experience—the direction of motivational force (towards or away) and the intensity of the 
motivational force (strong or weak).  In trying to understand how much someone values the latest 
Woody Allen movie, regulatory engagement theory suggests that we need to consider not only 
whether that individual experiences attraction or repulsion towards the movie (direction), but 
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also whether that attraction/repulsion is strong versus weak (intensity). Whether someone will 
feel attraction or repulsion towards the movie depends on a number of factors that have 
traditionally been associated with value – the movie’s subjective pleasure/pain properties, the 
movie’s ability to fulfill some need (e.g., after a drought of Woody Allen flicks), whether one is 
watching the movie with other Woody Allen aficionados, and whether the alternate film that 
could be viewed instead is the latest Disney versus Coen Brothers creation. The idea that such 
factors impact the direction of the value experience is not new. The idea that such factors can 
impact the intensity of the value experience is also not new.  
  What is new is the idea that the intensity of the motivational force can be affected not only 
by the hedonic properties of the target object (and other sources of value direction), but also by 
factors that are independent of the object or outcome of goal pursuit. These nondirectional 
factors (e.g. overcoming and opposing obstacles, experienced likelihood of outcome attainment, 
and the use of “fit” and “proper” means) can impact the value experience because they influence 
strength of engagement and thereby change the intensity of the value experience. That brings us 
to our first points of clarification. How is engagement defined within this model?  And what, 
exactly, is the nature of the relationship between engagement, value, and action?  
Defining Engagement 
 As Ayelet Fishbach (2009) points out in her commentary, value experiences may play an 
instrumental role in motivating subsequent action (more about this later). She refers to this 
“motivation to act” as engagement. We want to be clear that this definition of engagement is not 
the one adopted by regulatory engagement theory. In regulatory engagement theory, engagement 
is defined as a state of being involved, occupied, fully absorbed, or engrossed in something. In 
this definition, engagement is not synonymous with a motivation to act or the likelihood of goal 
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completion.  The more engaged I am in the movie, the less likely I may be to pay attention to the 
skirmish in the row behind me or the more likely I may be to attend to the unfolding of the 
central plot points.  Engagement, as defined in this model, is about sustained attention.  As 
explicitly stated in regulatory engagement theory, engagement is simply an intensifier. Stronger 
engagement does not direct action by itself because, by itself, it is directionless.  Furthermore, 
while stronger engagement contributes to stronger motivational force intensity, motivational 
force intensity is also, by itself, directionless.  Motivational force intensity is about the intensity 
of “wanting.”  Other factors give direction that makes the wanting either about wanting to make 
something happen or wanting to make something not happen. The intensity alone does not yield 
action. Direction, to which factors other than engagement strength contribute, is also necessary.  
 Although engagement is about sustained attention, Pham and Avnet (2009) suggested that 
behavioral withdrawal (looking away from the movie, for instance) may not always signal lower 
engagement. While we agree that the relation of engagement to specific behavioral actions is not 
direct, behaviorally turning attention away from something will generally result in lower 
engagement by definition. A person who turns away from the movie is in state of low 
engagement vis-à-vis the movie because their attention to the movie is not sustained. Behavioral 
withdrawal may occur because of initially great engagement (e.g., a gruesome scene), but the 
withdrawal itself would generally result in lower engagement. Indeed, this is probably why the 
attention withdrawal often happens.  
 Studies examining actual or mental distancing (e.g., Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005) 
suggest that negative value can be attenuated by this kind of pulling away. However, because it 
is also possible to look away from the movie while continuing to focus intensely on the mental 
image that remains, we do recognize that behavioral withdrawal will not always lead to lower 
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engagement. One of the challenges going forward will be to find additional behavioral and 
physiological markers of engagement that can help to clarify the nature of this sustained 
absorption. In addition, we are not suggesting that the attention withdrawal cannot be followed 
by engagement with some other target, such as hugging your partner for comfort. But the 
attention withdrawal itself is likely to weaken engagement with the movie. 
 We also believe that engagement is not synonymous with arousal (see also Higgins, 2006), 
though we agree with Pham and Avnet (2009) that more must be done to clearly delineate their 
differences. One of the primary reasons we believe that engagement cannot be equated with 
arousal is evidence that arousal may actually decrease with sustained attention (Parasuraman, 
1984; Coull, 1998 for a review).  Furthermore, there is some empirical work that suggests that 
arousal alone may not be able to account for predicted strength of engagement effects. In studies 
we conducted in collaboration with Janina Marguc (Higgins, Marguc, & Scholer, 2009), all 
participants were exposed to the same aversive background noise while working on an anagram 
task. In other words, all participants were exposed to the same arousing unpleasant stimulus. 
However, only participants who were presented with the noise as an “interference to oppose” 
(i.e., to be dealt with by increasing attention to the task) showed the predicted engagement 
effects (stronger task engagement increasing the attractiveness of the task reward).  Participants 
who were presented with the same noise as a “nuisance to be coped with” (i.e., by turning 
attention away from the task) did not show these effects. That said, we certainly agree with Pham 
and Avnet that more direct tests of the differences between engagement and arousal are needed 
in the future.  
Value Dynamics: Engagement, Value, & Action 
 Although our definition of engagement differs from Fishbach (2009), we do agree with her 
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suggestion that goals can motivate engagement and disengagement (as defined by regulatory 
engagement theory) and can influence the value assigned to objects. How can this be a model 
that allows both for “doing is for liking” and “liking is for doing?” It is important, first, to note 
that regulatory engagement theory is a model of the antecedents of the value experience. In this 
sense, the model highlights the ways in which “doing is for liking” because of the role, in 
particular, of goal pursuit processes in shaping engagement strength and value intensity. 
However, that does not mean that this value experience plays no further role in motivating 
action. Indeed, many of the empirical tests of regulatory engagement theory end with action, 
such as task performance, not just evaluation (e.g., Bianco, Higgins, & Klem, 2003; Hong & 
Lee, 2008; Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998).  
 Additionally, while the theory emphasizes the causal direction from engagement to value, 
the theory is not silent on the effect of hedonic evaluation on engagement. In the original 
formulation (Higgins, 2006), and in the current elaboration (Higgins & Scholer, 2009), people’s 
subjective responses to the hedonic properties of an object or activity are explicitly included as 
an additional source of engagement strength. This means that there is a dynamic process 
whereby the evaluation of some object influences engagement, which then, along with other 
sources of engagement strength, intensifies or de-intensifies the value reaction to the object. 
From the perspective of regulatory engagement theory, both causal directions are important and 
need to be included in a full account of the reciprocal relation between value and engagement. 
The theory emphasizes the effect of engagement on value because this is the direction that, 
historically, has received the least attention in the literature. 
 Furthermore, regulatory engagement theory suggests some interesting ways in which 
individuals could exert control over value in the service of action. Fishbach (2009) suggests that 
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“people may actively bolster or undermine the value of certain goal states in order to influence 
their motivation toward and away from these states. That is, evaluation can serve as a self-
control function” (5).  Often this bolstering or undermining of value is done through hedonic 
channels – through increasing the pleasure or pain properties of some target (e.g., associating a 
target with positive or negative affective evaluations, Custers & Aarts, 2005). However, 
regulatory engagement theory makes clear that the hedonic (directional) channel may not be the 
only way in which people can bolster or undermine value in the service of effective self-
regulation. Given that there are non-directional factors that affect value through their effects on 
value intensity, it’s possible that people may enact control through these channels as well. For 
instance, when confronted with an unexpected obstacle, people could increase the anticipated 
pleasure of goal attainment to boost their motivation and not give up.  But they could also  
create an obstacle as something to be opposed, such as increasing perceived task difficulty, in 
order to strengthen engagement and increase value itself. In sum, Fishbach (2009) raises an 
important question about the function of value that we believe can be explored in interesting 
ways within the framework of regulatory engagement theory.  
 The above example of increasing perceived task difficulty as a tactic to strengthen 
engagement raises another issue from the commentaries that we would like to briefly address. 
Jens Förster (2009) suggested that difficulty is the driving factor for strength of engagement. 
Given that some sources of stronger engagement (e.g., use of fit or proper means, high 
likelihood) do not concern difficulty, we would not agree that difficulty is the driving factor for 
engagement strength. It is true that opposing interfering forces and overcoming personal 
resistance, as sources of engagement strength, can be related to the variable of difficulty. Even 
here, however, the relation between difficulty and opposition or overcoming is not 
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straightforward. As is discussed in more detail in Higgins (2006), difficulty can reach a point 
where people no longer oppose or overcome but instead quit—which weakens engagement. 
Thus, although we would argue that greater opposition or greater overcoming strengthens 
engagement, we would not argue that greater difficulty, by itself, strengthens engagement.  
Regulatory Engagement Theory and Cognitive Dissonance 
 The last conceptual clarification we want to address is in response to parallels that are 
sometimes drawn between regulatory engagement theory and cognitive dissonance theory (e.g., 
Fishbach, 2009; Pham & Avnet, 2009). While regulatory engagement theory can provide an 
alternative account for the findings of some paradigmatic dissonance studies, such as “effort 
justification” studies, engagement theory and dissonance theory do not always make the same 
predictions nor, when they do, are the underlying mechanisms posited to be the same. For 
instance, imagine that you decide to scour your bathtub in order to have a clean house (a positive 
outcome). This may induce dissonance because of the presence of two inconsistent thoughts: 
“This is unpleasant and hard” and “I freely chose to do it.” Cognitive dissonance theory proposes 
that you could reduce this dissonance by increasing the value of ending up with a clean house 
(adding consonant justifications). A different (additional) mechanism for the increase in value, 
proposed by regulatory engagement theory, is that overcoming your inherent resistance 
strengthens engagement, intensifying the positivity of a clean house.   
 Although the underlying mechanisms are different, in some cases, like the example above, 
both theories make the same prediction. But this is not always the case. For example, there are 
two classic predictions that dissonance theory makes that regulatory engagement theory does not: 
a) attitude change or value increase is more likely to occur under a condition of free choice than 
under forced choice; and b) in a choice between two positive alternatives, the forsaken option 
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should decrease in value, while the chosen option increases in value, in order to justify the 
decision (i.e., the classic spreading effect).  We recently conducted a study to tease apart these 
two differing predictions that dissonance versus engagement theory would make (Higgins, 
Marguc, & Scholer, 2009, Study 3).  
 In the Higgins et al. (2009) study, participants had to choose between two anagram tasks 
(one with an interfering noise, one with no noise) associated with different attractive gifts under 
“free choice” or “forced choice” conditions. All participants ultimately worked on the same 
anagram task in the presence of an interfering noise that was presented as an “interference to 
oppose.” To the extent that participants perceived the background noise as a difficulty or 
challenge (i.e., something to be opposed), we predicted that the prize should increase in value. 
Whereas regulatory engagement theory predicts the value increase in both conditions, the 
presence of a dissonance mechanism should yield a stronger effect in the “free choice” than the 
“forced choice” condition (where the effect could even disappear because being “forced” to do 
the task is a consonant element). Second, after completing the anagram task, participants 
evaluated both gifts (both the chosen and forsaken gift). If a dissonance mechanism were present 
(under “Free Choice”), then the chosen gift should increase in value but the forsaken gift should, 
if anything, decrease in value (again, the classic “spreading effect”). According to regulatory 
engagement theory, however, the positive value for both gifts should increase because 
strengthened engagement would intensify their attractiveness. In support of a regulatory 
engagement mechanism, participants evaluated both gifts more highly as perceived difficulty 
increased, and just as much in the “forced choice” condition as in the “free choice” condition. 
 We certainly are not suggesting that this engagement mechanism supplants or replaces a 
dissonance mechanism. Cognitive dissonance theory is about how inconsistency can result in 
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justifications that produce value change. Regulatory engagement theory is about how 
overcoming resistance strengthens engagement that produces value change. Indeed, dissonance 
resolution from justification concerns a way of establishing what’s real, a mechanism for 
experiencing “truth,” that is totally independent of engagement strength as a motivational 
mechanism (see Higgins, 2009). This means that cognitive dissonance theory has regions of 
applicability where regulatory engagement theory is silent. We are simply claiming that the 
opposite is also true. Regulatory engagement theory has regions of applicability where cognitive 
dissonance theory is silent. When there is overlap of applicability, as in some “effort 
justification” studies, then regulatory engagement theory can provide an additional, perhaps 
complementary, account for the obtained findings. As Pham and Avnet (2009) point out, another 
critical approach for disambiguating the differences between regulatory engagement theory and 
cognitive dissonance theory will be to do more studies where the target object is negative – a 
situation, depending on the appropriate conditions, in which regulatory engagement theory 
would predict an intensification of negativity whereas cognitive dissonance theory would predict 
an attenuation.   
Regulatory fit, Likelihood, and a New Story of Obstacles 
 Across the commentaries, one consistent theme revolved around the question of when 
different potential sources of engagement will actually increase versus decrease engagement. 
Although we emphasized the ways in which being in a state of regulatory fit increases 
engagement, Lee (2009) suggested that there may be times when regulatory nonfit will increase 
engagement. Although we argued in the target paper that high likelihood will often increase 
engagement because it makes future outcomes feel real, i.e., something one needs to prepare for, 
Fishbach (2009) suggested that low likelihood may also sometimes increase engagement.  
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Specifically, both Lee and Fishbach suggest the interesting possibility that regulatory nonfit and 
low likelihood can be conceptualized as types of obstacles. Pham and Avnet (2009) asked a 
slightly different, though related question: how can we know a priori when individuals will resist 
an interfering force or try to oppose an obstacle? According to regulatory engagement theory, 
obstacles and challenges would only strengthen engagement when they are opposed, so it is 
important to think about when and why individuals will oppose perceived obstacles.  
 These commentaries highlight that, especially regarding regulatory fit and likelihood as 
sources of engagement, there are really two stories to be told. Regarding regulatory fit, Lee 
(2009) suggests that whether regulatory fit or nonfit has a greater impact on creating value may 
depend on an individual’s pre-existing level of engagement. When individuals are not very 
engaged, regulatory fit may be more likely to affect value because of the enhanced fluency and 
ease of processing associated with regulatory fit (Hong & Lee, 2008; Wang & Lee, 2006). 
However, when individuals have high pre-existing engagement strength, then regulatory nonfit 
may actually result in ultimately greater engagement. Why would this be the case?  In large part, 
it has to do with the question that Pham and Avnet (2009) raised. It may be that the people most 
likely to oppose obstacles are the ones who are already somewhat involved. Thus, for these 
individuals, non-fit may function like an obstacle – a problem that needs attention – 
strengthening engagement. In contrast, individuals who have initially low involvement may not 
be motivated enough to oppose the obstacle. For these individuals, regulatory fit, rather than 
nonfit, may be more likely to result in increased engagement. 
 This same logic can be applied to understanding when high versus low likelihoods will 
lead to more or less engagement. When there is high engagement to begin with, then low 
likelihoods, now functioning as perceived difficulty, may create obstacles individuals oppose, 
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further strengthening engagement. However, when there is low engagement initially, high 
likelihoods may establish the future reality that increases engagement because of the need to be 
prepared.  
 One intriguing note to consider, however, is how the likelihood is presented. Fishbach and 
Zhang (2008; reported in Fishbach, 2009) found that those who believed that their likelihood of 
developing cholesterol was high were more likely to value activities that could promote good 
health. But does it matter whether people are told about the high likelihood of developing 
cholesterol versus the low likelihood of staying healthy? From the perspective of “high 
likelihood strengthens engagement because it makes future outcomes feel real,” people told that 
they have a high likelihood of developing cholesterol would be more engaged that people told 
that they have a low likelihood of staying healthy. From the perspective of  “low likelihood 
strengthens engagement because it acts as an obstacle,” either framing might be effective in 
strengthening engagement.  
 Lee (2009) and Fishbach (2009) have raised an important and interesting issue about the 
story of obstacles. They suggest that the pre-existing level of engagement, perhaps as embodied 
in pre-existing motivational force intensity, may be an important factor in whether regulatory fit 
or nonfit, high or low likelihood, will have a greater effect on value creation.  We believe that 
this is an intriguing suggestion and one worthy of further exploration. That said, we don’t want 
to claim that this solves the puzzle that Pham and Avnet (2009) raised. This doesn’t tell us how 
much pre-existing engagement is enough or how to assess that a priori across contexts. However, 
Förster’s (2009) integration of regulatory engagement theory with other dynamic goal theories 
suggests the possibility that the dynamics of goal systems may provide some insight into 
predicting, a priori, levels of pre-existing engagement (e.g., the difference between unfulfilled 
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versus completed goals; the mechanisms of goal shielding).  Thus, we believe that these 
proposals suggest some ways to begin to address this issue. 
 We should emphasize, however, that the regulatory fit part of the story may be more 
complicated due to the multiple channels through which it could affect value. Although we 
touched upon this in the target article, we want to say a bit more here, particularly in response to 
the ideas developed by Pham and Avnet (2009) about how two of the channels through which 
regulatory fit could work might operate depending on individuals’ “pre-existing level of 
involvement.”  Pham and Avnet (2009) differentiate between regulatory fit effects that appear to 
operate through a “feeling right as feeling good” feelings-as-information mechanism (Pham, 
2004; Schwarz & Clore, 2007) versus an engagement mechanism.1  Specifically, Pham and 
Avnet (2009) suggest that when individuals have a high pre-existing level of involvement, 
regulatory fit will be more likely to operate through an engagement mechanism. However, they 
suggest that when individuals have a low pre-existing level of involvement, regulatory fit may be 
more likely to operate through the “feeling right as feeling good” mechanism.   
 If we combine their proposal with that made by Lee (2009), it suggests that people’s pre-
existing level of involvement could impact both whether regulatory nonfit would be experienced 
as an obstacle to be overcome (more likely when level of involvement is higher) and the channel 
through which regulatory fit might operate (the engagement mechanism more likely than the 
“feeling right as feeling good” mechanism). Thus, pre-existing high involvement and non-fit 
would operate through the engagement mechanism, which for the case of message persuasion, 
would intensify negative reactions to low quality arguments and intensify positive reactions to 
high quality arguments—an enhanced “strength of argument” effect on persuasion.  
 As has been discussed elsewhere, there appear to be multiple ways in which regulatory fit 
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has its effects (see Cesario, Higgins, & Scholer, 2008; Lee & Higgins, in press). While there is 
clear evidence that regulatory fit operates at least sometimes by strengthening engagement, that 
does not preclude the possibility that regulatory fit affects value creation through other channels 
as well. And it appears that variables such as whether regulatory fit is created prior to exposure 
to a value target, or whether it is created by a property that is part of the value target itself, are 
also important to consider. Bottom line: There is still a lot to be learned about the underlying 
mechanisms. 
Regulatory Engagement Theory and Multifinality 
 Förster (2009) asked to what extent might regulatory engagement effects be accounted for 
by a goal-systems approach to thinking about multifinality (cf. Kruglanski, Shah, Friedman, 
Chun, & Sleeth-Keppler, 2002). “One may argue that a process goal, such as ‘doing things the 
proper way’ is a goal in itself; in this way, any situation of fit can be reduced to a situation in 
which two goals are active at the same time, increasing value” (Förster, 2009, p. 10).  We should 
note that the notion of multifinality providing an alternative explanation to regulatory 
engagement theory is probably most relevant for the “use of proper means” and “regulatory fit” 
sources of engagement. It’s less clear how multifinality could provide an alternative explanation 
for strength of engagement effects arising from high likelihood, for instance. In this section, we 
discuss the similarities and differences between a multifinality account of goal creation and a 
regulatory engagement theory account of goal creation. To do this, we return to the scene of 
Förster’s (2009) three-star restaurant. 
 Let’s take the case of someone trying to decide between two three-star restaurants: one that 
is known for also being environmentally-minded, i.e., “green”, while the other is simply known 
for its three stars. To make it more fun, let’s imagine our decider uses proper means in making 
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this decision and decides to go to the “green” restaurant. From a goal systems, multi-finality 
perspective, deciding to go to this restaurant serves two focal goals – the goal to eat fine food 
and the goal to “be green,” and perhaps even a third, background goal with respect to doing 
things in the proper way. From a goal systems perspective, the choice – the restaurant – is more 
highly valued because it serves multiple goals. Using proper means adds value to the restaurant 
in much the same way as choosing it because of its environmental attitude.  Thus, a multifinality 
perspective could account for the increased value of the restaurant. But, importantly, though the 
restaurant may be valued more, the multifinality perspective is silent about how the decision to 
go to the restaurant will affect your actual experience of the food at dinner.  
 From a regulatory engagement theory perspective, the greater engagement from using 
proper means would intensify the actual value experience of the dining activity itself. If the 
restaurant lived up to its reputation, this would mean intensified attraction to food that was liked. 
But if the chef was having an off night, this could mean intensified repulsion to food that was 
disliked. These predictions are not made by a goal systems, multi-finality model. We believe that 
both goal systems theory and regulatory engagement theory make contributions to understanding 
value creation, but the mechanisms and predictions made by the two theories are not always the 
same. Critically, attaining multiple goals from a choice, like choosing to eat at the restaurant, 
will make the choice itself more positive. But regulatory engagement theory is also concerned 
with the value experience of the target of the goal pursuit, i.e., eating in this case, and its value 
could become more positive or more negative from stronger engagement depending on the 
valence direction of the target response. Together, a customer could end up saying, “It was 
definitely the right choice to come here to eat, but, unfortunately, the food was pretty terrible.”  
The Engagement Experience 
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 Most of the commentaries focused on the effects of engagement on the value of the target. 
This makes sense, as this was the primary focus of the theory’s debut (Higgins, 2006), and has 
been the primary focus of the empirical work that’s been done.  However, in the target article, we 
suggested that to really understand the “art and science” of value creation, it’s important to 
consider the effects of these different sources of engagement strength not only on the target, but 
also on the experience of the goal pursuit activity itself.  We want to end our discussion here with 
some thoughts about the engagement experience that were highlighted, particularly, in the Pham 
and Avnet (2009) and Förster (2009) commentaries. 
 Pham and Avnet (2009) agree that value intensity is an important part of the value 
experience. However, they suggest that at least sometimes, value intensification effects may 
reflect the operation of a “feelings-of-engagement-as-information” process (as does Förster, 
2009).  Specifically, Pham and Avnet (2009) suggest that the question “how strongly do I feel 
about it?” in Pham’s (2008) general-affect-as-information model (GAIM) may capture an 
inferential process by which people use the intensity of their reactions to determine value. To 
what extent does regulatory engagement theory suggest that engagement operates through a 
direct intensification (experience) mechanism versus an inferential mechanism? 
 While we believe that there may be times at which the inferential process operates, we 
think that engagement often affects value intensity directly. In studies of persuasion or 
evaluation, it’s harder to distinguish between the operation of the two potential mechanisms. 
However, in studies where the dependent measure has been performance, an experience 
mechanism can more easily account for the effects than an inferential mechanism. For example, 
regulatory fit effects have been found on better memory for the central events in a documentary 
film (Bianco, Higgins, & Klem, 2003) and on squeezing a handgrip longer (Hong and Lee, 
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2008).  Additionally, regulatory engagement theory was developed on the basis of evidence from 
both human and non-human animals. A direct experience mechanism can be applied to both 
groups, whereas an inferential mechanism cannot be as easily applied to non-human animals. 
 We want to end with a statement about why we believe it matters to separate direction and 
intensity, even if the value is typically experienced holistically. If the value experience derived 
its intensity solely from properties of the target object/goal object itself (e.g., the concentration of 
fragrance in a perfume), such separation may not be essential. However, because value intensity 
can be affected by sources unrelated to the properties of the target object (e.g., a decision process 
involved in purchasing the perfume that creates regulatory fit; obstacles encountered in the 
process), such separation has significant implications for understanding value creation. Indeed, 
such sources can involve affective experiences that are opposite to their effect on the value of the 
final object (e.g., hating the obstacle but loving the target).  Thus, to understand the ultimate 
effects of a particular factor, it is necessary to consider both how the source affects engagement 
strength (intensifying or deintensifying reaction to the value target) and how the source affects 
the experience of goal pursuit (e.g., making the goal pursuit activity itself more or less pleasant), 
recognizing that these two separate effects can go in opposite value directions.   
Concluding Thoughts  
 It is our hope that regulatory engagement theory stimulates thinking about the value 
creation process, highlighting in particular how factors related to the process of goal pursuit itself 
can affect value intensity. Certainly, our own thinking was stimulated by the thoughtful and 
insightful commentaries in response to our target article. We thank all of the commentators for 
the opportunity for this rich discussion.  
 We conclude with two caveats and a hope. Although we believe that regulatory 
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engagement theory proposes a useful framework for thinking about value, clearly it is not the 
whole story. Some significant and interesting questions about how value is created, maintained, 
and relates to action fall outside the scope of the theory (cf. Fisbach, 2009). Clearly, too, the 
theory itself is still being developed. With that in mind, we believe that there are exciting 
chapters ahead in this unfolding story and look forward to further discussions and input from 
others that can guide the exploration.  
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Footnote 
 
1.  Pham and Avnet (2009) discuss “feeling right” as a “feeling right as feeling good” affect-as-
information mechanism.  However, “feeling right” can also refer to feeling right about one’s 
reaction (positive or negative) to a situation or target (cf. Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004). In 
situations where one’s reaction to a situation/target is negative, these two mechanisms make 
different predictions, as discussed by Cesario et al. (2004), Cesario, Higgins, and Scholer (2008), 
and Lee and Higgins (in press). 
